Brewer questions redundancy failure between Brooklyn and Bronx PSACs
Brewer asks why redundancy between PSAC 1 and PSAC 2 didn't work. Gelobter explains redundant systems exist for cybersecurity breaches, power outages, and natural disasters, but this issue didn't trigger any fail-safes. She acknowledges the need to understand what additional alerts can be put in place.
I want to be sure.
The second question I have, which is, you probably have answered it three times, but I remember when PSAC 2 was built, and it was supposed to be redundancy and so on.
So my question, maybe you've said this three times and I missed it, but why wasn't redundancy there between Brooklyn and the Bronx?
Yes, thank you for the question.
We do have redundant systems in place at multiple levels for issues like cybersecurity breaches or power outages or natural disasters.
This issue
did not trigger any of those fail-safes, and that is something that we really have to understand what can be put into place so that these things can be caught earlier.
I will say the monitoring that is currently set up and put into place is very thoughtful.
And rigorous, it is not possible to plan and design to capture any or foresee any anomaly that ever exists.
That's not to say that we can't work to put additional alarms and alerts into place, and that's why today we've already set up these interim manual monitoring systems.
You know, when you hear redundancy, you think it's for everything if you're not part of the nuanced, just so you know.