Brewer questions companies on validation, China, and ICE cooperation
Councilmember Gale Brewer asks about third-party validation failure impact, what companies send to China, and whether companies support not helping ICE. Companies describe their evaluator processes; Cahill and Graham note Chinese distillation and prohibitions; Friend says Google doesn't train in China; all offer follow-up on ICE.
Councilmember Brewer, followed by Narcisse.
Thank you very much.
I wanted to know three quick questions.
If a model provider you rely on, you or a subcontractor, did not complete the third-party validation for a particular package,
How would that affect your product's availability?
And also, how do you decide who gets the validation?
Number one.
Number two, China.
The speaker asked about China and competition, and I thought the answer was, don't worry, they need information from us.
So I'm wondering, what do you send to China?
And number three, ICE.
I was upset that one of the whistleblowers said that Google has been working something to do with ICE and Minnesota.
So my question is, do you all support not helping ICE at all?
Obviously, you are made up of immigrants.
We should not be shipping immigrants out of this country.
Please answer those three questions, and thank you.
So I'll start with the question on third-party evaluations.
We work with a range of third parties to evaluate our models.
That includes independent investigators as well as with the federal government.
And then we detail who we worked with and the results in our system card when we released our model.
Decisions to launch our models are described in our preparedness framework.
And so that describes how we integrate all of the results of evaluations and make decisions with respect to launching models.
So I would point you there on that particular issue.
On the question of China and the PRC, I would like to get back to you on that particular issue.
Although I have a national security background, I'm not working in that role at the company, and I want to make sure I get you.
Good information.
Similarly, with respect to ICE, I'd like to get back to you.
I'm not aware of any activities working with ICE, but I don't work on our government sales team, so I'd like to get back to you on that.
Next.
Handsome member, thank you very much for your three questions.
In relation to- Three questions.
Pardon?
Three questions.
Yes, three, sorry.
My accent might have gotten in the way there, apologies.
Three questions.
For third-party validators, we also work with a range of validators and assessors, and we also provide this information in our publicly available preparedness reports.
In relation to China and competition, I might just mention that, you know, Meta is a proud American company and proud to serve billions of people around the world who rely on our services.
We want to ensure that the U.S.
And democratic countries lead on AI.
And one thing I would just note here is in relation to the importance of open weights and American open weights
and the criticality of ensuring that American innovation continues to lead in relation to the availability of open weight models.
And in relation to ICE, if I may, I would like to connect you with our teams and experts in that space.
I don't wish to be imprecise in responding to you.
Next.
Ma'am, in terms of third-party evaluators, we also work with the USKC, which is the organization underneath the Commerce Department that does testing of advanced AI models.
We also work with a range of third-party evaluators.
It's a very nascent ecosystem, and one of the challenges in evaluating AI models, of course, is to get organizations
that both have the technical competency to do evaluations well, but also have the subject matter expertise that we may be looking for.
Earlier, one of the council members mentioned concerns about bio, for example.
We have third parties that have the bio expertise that's necessary.
But as we have this national conversation about independent verification organizations and third-party evaluations, keeping in mind that we still need to mature this ecosystem of independent evaluators, I think is really important.
On China and competition, I'd like the opportunity to give you a more complete answer.
We don't conduct AI research or training in China.
I know that we are part of the conversation about what it means for America to lead in AI, where we are in the technological race with China.
I will just mention that.
We focus a lot on who's at the frontier, which country has the most cutting-edge research in AI, but we talk much less often about deployment of AI.
And there, I think we should really keep an eye on the Chinese.
They have emphasized deploying AI in their economy quite a bit, and that's a place where I sometimes have concerns that the United States is in danger of falling behind China.
As to the whistleblowers,
from today.
I don't have any specifics about that, but I'd be happy to ask the public policy team in New York to get back to you right away with any information that we have about it.
Next.
And at Anthropic, the use of third parties for verification, developing and using
evaluations for models has been the part of the process from day one, including with not just external parties in industry or nonprofits, but also with governments such as the US Casey.
This has been foundational.
As my colleague said, it's pretty nascent.
We think it needs to be urgently expanded and not just used for pre-deployment testing, but also to understand models and their behavior after deployment and the safety processes at companies.
In the case of China, I think it's very clear that the first thing that we need to do is maintain an American and democratic lead in model capabilities.
But we're very clear about the threat elsewhere as well.
So we have publicly documented Chinese attempts to distill our models, essentially take the content and capabilities for their own.
And we work to ban those.
We have prohibited use of models in China.
We do not serve there.
And we have also documented the use, we believe, by related parties of CLAWD or the attempt to
for cyber offensive reasons.
We are extremely serious about this and we think it's a very substantial priority and this is one reason why we have advocated at the federal level for export controls on the most important chips that power AI innovation here.
And on your third question, while I'm not
across the issue enough to know what our engagements are.
I will say that our usage policy, we ban surveillance, censorship, prohibited law enforcement and criminal justice uses for this purpose.
Thank you.
Thank you.